Awad v. ZiriaxUnless otherwise stated, you should answer in complete sentences, and be sure to usecorrect English, spelling, and grammar. Sources must be cited in APA format.Your response should be a minimum of four (4) double-spaced pages; refer to theLength and Formatting instructions below for additional details.In complete sentences respond to the following prompts:? Summarize the facts of the case;? Identify the parties and explain each party’s position;? Outline the case’s procedural history including any appeals;? What is the legal issue in question in this case?? How did the court rule on the legal issue of this case?? What facts did the court find to be most important in making its decision?? Respond to the following questions:o Can a U.S. court enforce a clause in a contract specifying that Sharia lawwill apply?o When, if ever, should a national court look to decisions of courts in othernations when interpreting its own nation’s constitution?o? Do you agree or disagree with the court’s decision? If you disagree, provide anexplanation of your reasoning.PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT MUNEER AWAD, Plaintiff – Appellee, v.PAUL ZIRIAX, Agency Head, Oklahoma State Board of Elections, THOMAS PRINCE, Chairman of theBoard, Oklahoma State Board of Elections, STEVE CURRY, Board Member, Oklahoma State Board ofElections, and JIM ROTH, Board Member, Oklahoma State Board of Elections, Defendants – Appellants. —————————- FOUNDATION OF MORAL LAW; THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEWYORK; THE ISLAMIC LAW COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWASSOCIATION, THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCHAND STATE, THE ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE BAPTIST JOINT COMMITTEE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,THE CENTER FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM, INTERFAITH ALLIANCE, AND THE No. 10-6273 FILED United StatesCourt of Appeals Tenth Circuit January 10, 2012 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court -2- UNION FORREFORM JUDAISM, Amici Curiae. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THEWESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA (D.C. NO. 5:10-CV-01186-M) Patrick R. Wyrick, Solicitor General(Scott D. Boughton and Janis Wood Preslar, Assistant Attorneys General, on the briefs), Office of theAttorney General of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, appearing for Appellant. Micheal Salem,Salem Law Offices, Norman, Oklahoma (Joseph Thai, Norman, Oklahoma; Gadeir Abbas, Council ofAmerican Islamic Relations, Washington, DC; and Daniel Mach and Heather L. Weaver, American CivilLiberties Union Foundation, Washington, DC, with him on the briefs), appearing for Appellee. Roy S.Moore, Benjamin D. DuPre, and John Allen Eidsmoe, Montgomery, Alabama, filed an Amicus Curiae briefon behalf of the Foundation of Moral Law. Robert E. Michael, Robert E. Michael & Associates, PLLC, NewYork, New York, filed an Amicus Curiae brief on behalf of Association of the Bar of the City of New Yorkand the Islamic Law Committee of the American Branch of the International Law Association. Craig C.Martin, Jenner & Block, LLP, Chicago, Illinois, and Joshua M. Segal, Jenner & Block, LLP, Washington, DC,filed an Amicus Curiae brief on behalf of American Jewish Committee; Americans United for Separationof Church and State; AntiDefamation League; Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty; Center forIslamic Pluralism; Interfaith Alliance; and Union for Reform Judaism. Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, andMATHESON, Circuit Judges. MATHESON, Circuit Judge. -3- On November 2, 2010, Oklahoma votersapproved a proposed constitutional amendment that would prevent Oklahoma state courts fromconsidering or using Sharia law. Before the amendment can become effective, the Oklahoma StateElection Board must certify this election result. The Board members have asked us to review whether afederal district court abused its discretion when it granted a preliminary injunction to prevent themfrom certifying the result. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion. I. BACKGROUND A.Constitutional Amendments in Oklahoma We start with an explanation of the constitutional amendmentprocess in Oklahoma and how its courts construe such amendments. The state constitution can beamended in several ways. See Okla. Const. art. 24. We focus on the process used in this case. Underarticle 24, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution,1 the state legislature may 1 This provision of theOklahoma Constitution states: Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed ineither branch of the Legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of all the memberselected to each of the two (2) houses, such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeasand nays thereon, be entered in their journals and referred by the Secretary of State to the people fortheir approval or rejection, at the next regular general election, except when the Legislature, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of each house, shall order a special election for that purpose. If a majority of all theelectors voting on any proposed amendment at such election shall vote in favor thereof, it shall therebybecome a part of this Constitution. Continued . . . -4- pass a proposed constitutional amendment. Thelegislature also drafts a ballot title that explains the proposed amendment to voters. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co.v. Okla. State Bd. of Equal., 231 P.3d 638, 642 (Okla. 2009). The proposed amendment and ballot titleare submitted to the Attorney General to ensure legal compliance. Id. The Attorney General mustspecify any defects “and, if necessary, . . . prepare a preliminary ballot title which complies with thelaw.” 34 Okla. Stat. tit. 34, § 9(C) (2009).2 Once certified by the Attorney General, the Secretary of______________________________________ Cont. No proposal for the amendment or alteration ofthis Constitution which is submitted to the voters shall embrace more than one general subject and thevoters shall vote separately for or against each proposal submitted; provided, however, that in thesubmission of proposals for the amendment of this Constitution by articles, which embrace one generalsubject, each proposed article shall be deemed a single proposal or proposition. Okla. Const. art. 24, § 1.2 This law was amended slightly in 2011. We refer to the 2009 version of the law, which was in effect forthe 2010 election. It stated in pertinent part: When a measure is proposed as a constitutionalamendment by the Legislature or when the Legislature proposes a statute conditioned upon approval bythe people: 1. After final passage of a measure, the Secretary of State shall submit the proposed ballottitle to the Attorney General for review as to legal correctness. Within five (5) business days, theAttorney General shall, in writing, notify the Secretary of State, the President Pro Tempore of the Senateand the Speaker of the House of Representatives whether or Continued . . . -5- State transmits theproposed measure and ballot title to the Election Board. Sw. Bell, 231 P.3d at 642. A proposedconstitutional amendment therefore “consist[s] of two substantive parts—the measure and the ballottitle.” Id. (quotations omitted). When the Oklahoma Supreme Court interprets a state constitutionalamendment’s meaning, it reads these parts together, regardless of whether there are “ambiguities orabsurdities.” Id. It considers the amendment’s text and the ballot title together because “those whoframed and adopted the amendment considered” both substantive parts. Id. “The understanding of______________________________________ Cont. not the proposed ballot title complies withapplicable laws. The Attorney General shall state with specificity any and all defects found and, ifnecessary, within ten (10) business days of determining that the proposed ballot title is defective,prepare a preliminary ballot title which complies with the law and furnish a copy of such ballot title tothe Secretary of State, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives. The Attorney General may consider any comments made by the President ProTempore of the Senate or the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and shall file a final ballot titlewith the Secretary of State no sooner than ten (10) business days and no later than fifteen (15) businessdays after furnishing the preliminary ballot title; and 2. After receipt of the measure and the officialballot title, as certified by the Attorney General, the Secretary of State shall within five (5) days transmitto the Secretary of the State Election Board an attested copy of the measure, including the official ballottitle. 34 Okla. Stat. tit. 34, § 9(C) (2009). -6- the Legislature as the framers and of the electorate as theadopters of the constitutional amendment is the best guide for determining an amendment’s meaningand scope, and such understanding is reflected in the language used in the measure and the ballot title.”Id. Oklahoma law provides that the Election Board must certify election results before a constitutionalamendment can take effect. See Okla. Const. art. 5, § 3; Okla. Stat. tit. 26, §§ 7-136, 12-118; Fent v.Henry, 257 P.3d 984, 986 (Okla. 2011). The State Election Board Rules provide that “[t]he State ElectionBoard meets at 5 p.m. on Tuesday next following an election involving . . . state questions to certify thefinal election results.” § 230:35-3-91(c). B. The Proposed “Save Our State” Constitutional AmendmentOn May 25, 2010, the Oklahoma House of Representatives and Senate passed House Joint Resolution1056 (“HJR 1056”). The resolution directed “the Secretary of State to refer to the people for theirapproval or rejection a proposed amendment to Section 1 of Article VII of the [Oklahoma] Constitution .. . [known as] the Save Our State Amendment.” Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 167. The proposed amendmentstates: The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exercising their judicial authority,shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the OklahomaConstitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, establishedcommon law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the lawof another state of the United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, inmaking judicial decisions. The courts -7- shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of thissubsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of firstimpression. Id. at 168 (emphases added). HJR 1056 also provided that the ballot title should state: Thismeasure amends the State Constitution. It would change a section that deals with courts of this state. Itwould make courts rely on federal and state laws when deciding cases. It would forbid courts fromlooking at international law or Sharia Law when deciding cases. SHALL THE PROPOSAL BE APPROVED? Id.at 169 (italic emphasis added). The Oklahoma Attorney General determined that the proposed ballottitle did “not comply with applicable laws.” Id. at 175. It did “not adequately explain the effect of theproposition because it [did] not explain what either Sharia Law or international law is.” Id. The AttorneyGeneral prepared a revised ballot title, which states: This measure amends the State Constitution. Itchanges a section that deals with the courts of this state. It would amend Article 7, Section 1. It makescourts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases. It forbids courts from considering or usinginternational law. It forbids courts from considering or using Sharia Law. International law is also knownas the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of international organizations and independent nations,such as countries, states and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each other. It also deals withsome of their relationships with persons. -8- The law of nations is formed by the general assent ofcivilized nations. Sources of international law also include international agreements, as well as treaties.Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the Koran and the teachings ofMohammed.3 SHALL THE PROPOSAL BE APPROVED? Id. at 178-79 (italic emphases added). The AttorneyGeneral refrained from giving any opinion “on the merits or constitutionality of the underlying proposedchanges in the law, [or] on the ability of federal law to preempt the changes in the law.” Id. at 178. Thisrevised ballot title was placed on the ballot as State Question 755 (“SQ 755”). On November 2, 2010, justover 70 percent of Oklahoma voters approved SQ 755. Without intervention, the proposed amendmentwould likely have been certified on November 9, 2010. See Okla. State Board Election Rule § 230:35-3-91(c). C. Procedural History On November 4, 2010, Muneer Awad sued the members of the OklahomaElection Board (collectively the “Appellants”). He sought to prevent certification of the SQ 755 electionresults. Mr. Awad, an American citizen residing in Oklahoma, is the executive director of the OklahomaChapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations. As a Muslim, he adheres to the religious principlesfrom the Koran and the teachings of Mohammed. 3 Various spellings have been used for “Sharia,”“Koran,” and “Mohammed.” We use the spellings adopted in the ballot title to avoid confusion. -9- Mr.Awad alleges that the Save Our State Amendment violates his rights under both the Establishment andFree Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. He objects to theamendment’s singling out his religion for negative treatment. He claims the amendment’simplementation would cause multiple adverse consequences, such as stigmatizing him and others whopractice the Muslim faith, inhibiting the practice of Islam, disabling a court from probating his last willand testament (which contains references to Sharia law), limiting the relief Muslims can obtain fromOklahoma state courts, and fostering excessive entanglement between the government and his religion.The district court granted a temporary restraining order on November 9, 2010. On November 22, 2010,the court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding Mr. Awad’s request for a preliminary injunction. Itgranted the preliminary injunction one week later. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D.Okla. 2010). Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on December 1, 2010. Oral argument occurredbefore this panel on September 12, 2011. Following oral argument, the parties were asked to filesimultaneous supplemental briefs to answer the following questions: 1. Should the test set forth inLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), govern the Establishment Clause issue in this case? See alsoHernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d1245 (10th Cir. 2008). Why or why not? -10- 2. How should the Establishment Clause issue be analyzedand decided under the Larson test, assuming it does apply? The parties filed supplemental briefs onNovember 2, 2011. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which authorizes appellate reviewof a district court’s interlocutory order granting a preliminary injunction. II. DISCUSSION Appellantschallenge the preliminary injunction. First, they argue that Mr. Awad’s claims are not justiciable. Second,they argue that, even if Mr. Awad’s Establishment or Free Exercise Clause claim is justiciable, each claimfails to meet preliminary injunction requirements. We hold that Mr. Awad’s Establishment Clause claimis justiciable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunctionbased on that claim. Because Mr. Awad’s Establishment Clause claim provides sufficient grounds touphold the preliminary injunction, we affirm without reaching Mr. Awad’s Free Exercise claim. A.Justiciability Appellants argue that Mr. Awad lacks standing and that his claims are not ripe for review.They have not distinguished between the justiciability of his Establishment and Free Exercise claims.Because we do not reach the Free Exercise claim, we address onl
y the justiciability of Mr. Awad’sEstablishment Clause claim. “We review questions of -11- justiciability de novo.” Kansas Judicial Reviewv. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1114 (10th Cir. 2008). 1. Mr. Awad Has Standing to Bring His EstablishmentClause Claim To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he or she has “suffered aninjury in fact;” (2) that the injury is “‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;” and, (3)that it is “likely” that “the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Ariz. Christian Sch. TuitionOrg. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011) (quotations omitted); see also Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012,1019 (10th Cir. 2011). “At bottom, the gist of the question of standing is whether petitioners have such apersonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness whichsharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.”Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quotations omitted). As in all standing analyses, wemust begin by determining whether Mr. Awad has alleged an injury in fact. To satisfy this requirement,plaintiffs must allege they “have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interestwhich is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1442 (quotations omitted). Appellants argue that Mr. Awad does not have standingbecause he has not -12- suffered an actual or imminent injury.4 They contend that because theamendment has not taken effect or been interpreted by any Oklahoma court, Mr. Awad’s allegedinjuries are necessarily speculative. They further contend that Mr. Awad’s assertion that he will sufferofficial condemnation of his religion is “personal opinion.” Aplt. Br. at 14. Mr. Awad claims that theamendment threatens to injure him in several ways, such as condemning his Muslim faith, inhibiting thepractice of Islam, disabling a court from probating his will (which contains references to Sharia law), andlimiting the relief he and other Muslims can obtain from Oklahoma state courts. Determining whether aplaintiff has alleged a sufficient injury in fact is often not difficult. But “the concept of injury for standingpurposes is particularly elusive in Establishment Clause cases.” Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494F.3d 494, 504-05 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted); see also Suhre v. Haywood Cnty., 131 F.3d 1083,1085 (4th Cir. 1997) (same quote); Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1230 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995)(“Standing is of course always necessary in an Establishment Clause case, and it is sometimes a difficultissue.”). The Supreme Court discussed this issue in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United forSeparation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). In Valley Forge, a group of plaintiffs dedicated tothe separation of church and state attempted to challenge the transfer of surplus federal property to aneducational institution affiliated 4 Appellants have not challenged the causation or redressabilityelements of Mr. Awad’s standing. -13- with a particular religious order. The plaintiffs learned about theconveyance through a press release. None of them lived in or near Pennsylvania, the site of the propertyat issue. The Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they failed to identify apersonal injury resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional transfer. The Court noted that it was notenough for litigants to claim a constitutional violation. Rather, plaintiffs must “identify a[] personalinjury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than thepsychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”Id. at 485 (emphasis in original). The Court noted that it was “not retreat[ing] from [its] earlier holdingsthat standing may be predicated on noneconomic injury.” Id. at 486. 5 Since Valley Forge, the SupremeCourt has not provided clear and explicit guidance on the difference between psychologicalconsequence from disagreement with government conduct and noneconomic injury that is sufficient toconfer standing.6 Our 5 This is consistent with our longstanding view that in Establishment Clause cases,“standing is clearly conferred by non-economic religious values.” Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475F.2d 29, 31 (10th Cir. 1973) superseded on other grounds by Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005);McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). See Soc’y of Separationistsv. Pleasant Grove City, 416 F.3d 1239, 1241 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005). 6 We have some direction, however,from the numerous cases in which the Court has addressed the merits of Establishment Clause claimsalleging exposure to unwelcome government-sponsored religious messages. Summarized in recentSeventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit opinions, these cases involved “a crèche in a county courthouse, acrèche in a public park, the Ten Commandments displayed on the grounds of a state capitol, the TenCommandments Continued . . . -14- court has addressed standing in the Establishment Clause context inseveral cases. For example, in O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2005), plaintiffs, acollege faculty member and a student, claimed their unwelcome exposure to a statue on their campusthat was allegedly hostile to their Catholic religion violated the Establishment Clause. We held theplaintiffs had standing. We noted that “[i]n the context of alleged violations of the Establishment Clause,this court has held that standing is clearly conferred by non-economic religious values.” Id. at 1222(quotations omitted). We explained, however, that “plaintiffs alleging non-economic injury must be‘directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints are directed.’” Id. at 1222-23(quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22). We then concluded that “[a]llegations of personal contactwith a state-sponsored [religious] image suffice to demonstrate this kind of direct injury.” Id. at 1223.______________________________________ Cont. displayed at a courthouse, a cross displayed in anational park, prayer in a football game, school prayer, a moment of silence at school, Bible reading at apublic school, and a religious invocation at graduation.” Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Obama,641 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2011) (Williams, J., concurring); Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rightsv. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2875 (2011). The Supreme Court recently cautioned that “[w]hen a potential jurisdictional defect isneither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that nodefect existed.” Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011).Nonetheless, the volume and content of Supreme Court merits decisions in Establishment Clausereligious display and expression cases involving noneconomic injury is instructive. -15- Our most recentEstablishment Clause case to address standing was American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095(10th Cir. 2010). In that case, plaintiffs challenged the placement of crosses on government property inremembrance of fallen highway patrol troopers. We concluded that the plaintiffs suffered anEstablishment Clause standing injury because they encountered an unwelcome government-sponsoredreligious symbol. We stated: “[A]llegations of personal contact with a state-sponsored image suffice todemonstrate . . . direct injury” for standing purposes in Establishment Clause cases. Id. at 1113(quotations omitted). As in many Establishment Clause cases, the American Atheists plaintiffs did notsuffer physical or economic injury. Their alleged injury was “personal and unwelcome contact with thecrosses.” Id. (quotations omitted). We said “these allegations establish standing.” Id. This basis forstanding was the same as in other cases in which plaintiffs have challenged
government-sponsoredreligious symbols. See, e.g., Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1989).Although standing remains difficult to define precisely in the Establishment Clause context, several keyprinciples can be distilled from the above-referenced cases. First, “[i]n the context of alleged violationsof the Establishment Clause, . . . standing is clearly conferred by non-economic religious values.”O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1222 (quotations omitted). Second, it is not enough for litigants to claim aconstitutional violation. They must also “identify a[] personal injury suffered by them as a consequenceof the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence -16- presumably producedby observation of conduct with which one disagrees.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485 (emphasis inoriginal). Finally, alleging only “personal and unwelcome contact” with government-sponsored religioussymbols is sufficient to establish standing. American Atheists, 637 F.3d at 1113 (quotations omitted). 7As in other Establishment Clause cases, Mr. Awad alleges that the amendment threatens him withnoneconomic injuries. In some respects, Mr. Awad’s alleged injuries are similar to those found sufficientto confer standing in our religious symbol Establishment Clause cases. Like the plaintiffs who challengedthe highway crosses in American Atheists, Mr. Awad suffers a form of “personal and unwelcomecontact” with an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution that would target his religion for disfavoredtreatment. As a Muslim and citizen of Oklahoma, Mr. Awad is “directly affected by the law[] . . . againstwhich [his] complaints are directed.” See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n.22 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist.v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963)). As further spelled out below, that is enough to conferstanding. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9. Mr. Awad alleges injuries beyond the “personal andunwelcome contact” that suffices for standing with religious symbols. He alleges that the amendmentcondemns his religious faith and exposes him to disfavored treatment. Such condemnation was not 7One of the American Atheists plaintiffs alleged that he was forced to alter his travel route to avoidcontact with the crosses. We said that such an allegation was not necessary for standing but furthersupported his standing. 637 F.3d at 1113 (quoting O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1223(10thCir. 2005)). -17- present in the religious symbol cases. The plaintiffs in those cases certainly mayhave felt that a religious display conflicted with their religious beliefs or non-belief, but those symbolsdid not expressly target and condemn a specific religion. Mr. Awad alleges that the amendmentcondemns his religion and prohibits him from relying on his religion’s legal precepts in Oklahoma courts,while not prohibiting people of all other faiths to rely on the legal precepts of their religions.8 Mr.Awad’s alleged injury goes significantly beyond a “psychological consequence” from disagreement withobserved government conduct, see Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485, “hurt feelings” from a presidentialproclamation requesting citizens to pray, Freedom from Religion Found. Inc. v. Obama, 641 F.3d 803,807 (7th Cir. 2011), or “a person’s deep and genuine offense to a defendant’s actions,” Catholic Leaguefor 8 In a case that did not involve the Establishment Clause, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984),plaintiffs, parents of black school children, sued the Internal Revenue Service for failure to enforce a lawto deny tax-exempt status to private schools that discriminated on the basis of race. The Court deniedthat the plaintiffs’ claim of a stigmatizing injury suffered by all members of a racial group was sufficientfor standing because the injury was too generalized and did not allege personal denial of equaltreatment: There can be no doubt that this sort of noneconomic injury is one of the most seriousconsequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in some circumstances to supportstanding. Our cases make clear, however, that such injury accords a basis for standing only to thosepersons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct. Id. at 755(quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, Mr. Awad’s injury is personal and concrete. -18- Religious and Civil Rights v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010) (enbanc) (Graber, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011). The harm alleged by Mr. Awad stemsfrom a constitutional directive of exclusion and disfavored treatment of a particular religious legaltradition. The district court seemed to rely in part on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Catholic League toconfer standing on Mr. Awad. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1303. We do not rely on Catholic League,although our standing holding is consistent with that case, and the contrast between the two casesillustrates the strength of Mr. Awad’s standing. In Catholic League, the court upheld plaintiffs’ standingto challenge a non-binding San Francisco Board of Supervisors resolution denouncing a Catholic Churchposition on homosexual adoptions. 624 F.3d at 1046-53. In this case, the Oklahoma Legislature did notsimply adopt a non-binding resolution opposing the consideration or use of Sharia law in state courts, itproposed and the electorate agreed to enshrine such a prohibition in the state’s constitution. Mr. Awadis facing the consequences of a statewide election approving a constitutional measure that woulddisfavor his religion relative to others. The non-binding city resolution in Catholic League conveyed “agovernment message,” 624 F.3d at 1048. The Oklahoma amendment conveys more than a message; itwould impose a constitutional command. We conclude that Mr. Awad’s allegation—that the proposedstate amendment expressly condemns his religion and exposes him and other Muslims in Oklahoma todisfavored treatment—suffices to establish the kind of direct injury-in-fact necessary to -19- createEstablishment Clause standing. Because the amendment would likely have been certified a week after itwas passed, we further conclude that the injury alleged by Mr. Awad is imminent and not conjectural orhypothetical. See Okla. State Election Board Rule § 230:35-3-91(c) (noting that the State Election Boardmeets on the Tuesday following an election to certify final election results on state questions); see alsoDaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345 (2006) (defining “imminent” injury as one that is“certainly impending” (quotations omitted)). Additionally, we agree with the district court that “plaintiffhas shown that his alleged injuries are fairly traceable to the challenged action of defendants and arelikely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1304. Mr. Awad therefore hasstanding to bring his Establishment Clause claim.9 2. The Establishment Clause Claim Is Ripe For ReviewWe also conclude that Mr. Awad’s Establishment Clause claim is ripe for review. The ripeness doctrineaims to prevent courts “from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements” by avoiding “prematureadjudication.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califanov. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). “Ripeness reflects constitutional considerations that implicateArticle III 9 Appellants have not challenged Mr. Awad’s prudential standing, nor do we discern any issueson that ground. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004). -20- limitations onjudicial power, as well as prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 (2010) (quotations omitted). Our ripeness analysisfocuses on “whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention.” Stout,519 F.3d at 1116 (quotations omitted). “‘[I]f a threatened injury is sufficiently “imminent” to establishstanding, the constitutional requirements of the ripeness doctrine will necessarily be satisfied.’”
Am.Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emp. Unionv. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Thus, for the reasons discussed in

 
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